Comment to the Georgia State Election Board: Reject new hand counting procedures after the polls close on Election Day

The Georgia State Election Board is considering an amendment to Rule 183–1–12-.12(a)(5) that would require new hand counting procedures after the polls close on Election Day. The proposed amendment would task election workers with additional, onerous steps after the polls close, such as independently hand-counting cast ballot amounts to cross-check with numbers found in “precinct poll pads,” ballot marking devices (which print ballots that voters may choose to spoil before casting), and the interim count of ballots from the ballot scanners. Workers would also be directed to correct perceived inconsistencies between these varying records before placing voted ballots in sealable containers.footnote1_Vwyc-I-KE9NDY8TIGeHkaCxkPUeTqbsYat3UY3SSJlU_x2ztdETeUfV21Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 183–1–14-.02(8).Implementing these changes less than 90 days before Election Day will burden county election superintendents and staff who would be required to create and implement new training materials on an accelerated timeline.

Like similar proposals in front of the board this election season, this amendment purports to “enhance election integrity,” provide “more accurate results,” and reduce “the opportunity for collusion to sabotage election results” and “electronic voting system error complaints.”footnote2_FVq-VHcgbTTyA4bCVjBcYFShSYsM1pJ9UDLFyTtYGuI_o75LU6HKxlOs2Georgia State Election Board, “Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Revisions to183–1–12-.12,” accessed August 15, 2024.However, this proposal would have the opposite effect: damaging election security in Georgia where there are already several safeguards in place to ensure voted ballots are included in election results.

The proposed amendment would muddle the strict and elaborate chain of custody already in place as well as the existing rules that require a poll manager and two sworn witnesses to place completed ballots in a sealable container and log/inventory such container for secured storage and transport to the election superintendent.footnote3_7CZKpPrTIwTAQwg2d4ThG61Q5HfiSsIUFUNBNYyZdc_yCS5GrPHZYdx3Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 183–1–12-.12(a)–(b).The proposal greatly increases the risk of ballots being misplaced or damaged, by requiring additional election workers (three poll workers) to individually handle voted paper ballots—counting into stacks of 50—for an extended and unbounded period before placing the ballots in a sealable container. Voted paper ballots would remain outside of their designated containers for as long as it takes the poll workers to count the ballots—potentially from multiple scanners—and arrive at uniform numbers. Not only is this process tedious, but it is also ripe for human error at the end of a long voting day and paves the way for heightened misinformation and accusations of fraud.

The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU Law submitted a comment describing the potential harms of the last-minute proposed changes as well as the critical safeguards already in place.