Homeland Security Investigations Documents

The Narcotics and Transnational Organized Crime Rewards Program Handbook, dated August 11, 2016, sets out the policies, procedures, responsibilities, guidelines, and controls followed by HSI special agents when submitting confidential informants for participation in the State Department’s Narcotics Rewards Program (NRP) or Transnational Organized Crime Rewards Program (TOCRP), administered by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). The Rewards Programs were established as a tool to assist the U.S. government in identifying and apprehending those who violate U.S. narcotics and transnational organized crime laws.   

ICE produced a series of documents from INL about the Rewards Programs. An undated document gives an overview of the TOCRP. The program authorizes rewards of up to $25 million for information leading to the arrest or conviction of members of transnational criminal organizations, including those involved in human trafficking, money laundering, cybercrime, or trafficking in arms, wildlife, counterfeits, and other goods. If an informant provides information leading to the arrest or conviction of a target, a U.S. government agency may submit a reward payment request to the State Department for consideration. An additional document dated January 2, 2019, provides an overview of the NRP, which also offers up to $25 million for information leading to the arrest or conviction of major narcotics traffickers operating abroad who send major quantities of drugs into the United States.  ICE also produced a template written by INL to request that a target be designated as part of the Rewards Programs. This document is largely redacted. Lastly, ICE produced a document outlining 22 U.S.C. § 2708, which establishes the Department of State rewards program.

The National Security Investigations Handbook, dated April 26, 2013, sets out the policies, procedures, responsibilities, guidelines, and controls followed by HSI special agents when they conduct investigations related to national security. This handbook also guides special agents on participation in investigations in support of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs).

• Significantly, the Handbook empowers special agents to conduct national security investigations (NSIs) primarily focused on intelligence collection, rather than criminal conduct, without limitations imposed by any publicly available intelligence guidelines. NSIs are frequently monitored to detect whether an individual or group has the intention and capabilities to carry out a terrorist attack.
• The Handbook articulates a broad understanding of HSI’s border search authority. Specifically, it notes that HSI special agents may conduct suspicionless searches of physical objects and documents contained in electronic devices alike, which is consistent with ICE’s and HSI’s public position on border search policies.
• The Handbook notes that HSI special agents should “lead JTTF investigations where ICE’s unique and vast statutory authorities” would help disrupt a terrorist attack. Both HSI and the DHS OIG have publicly acknowledged that HSI special agents may lead JTTF cases.

ICE also produced four undated and highly redacted “best practices” resource pages for the Counterterrorism Section (CTS) within HSI’s National Security Unit, which provides support to special agents and JTTFs. One of these includes a series of “considerations” for CTS personnel when they are responding to a “counterterrorism attack.” Another document provides guidance to CTS personnel regarding when and how to request FBI Letterhead Memoranda (LHM), which summarize derogatory information uncovered by federal agencies. A third pertains to information deconfliction in cases where HSI is a partner on a JTTF. The last provides guidance for HSI personnel to use the Significant Case Review (SCR) process to highlight ICE’s contributions to JTTF investigations.   

The Brennan Center also obtained an ICE directive dated December 3, 2019, titled “Reporting Protocol Following a Designated National Security Event or U.S.-based International Terrorist Attack.” The directive provides a reporting protocol for “all ICE investigative efforts and entities, and all activities, actions, and initiatives” conducted in the aftermath of a national security event or an international terrorist attack. The reporting protocol consolidates information streams to ensure that ICE leadership receives timely and accurate information.

Finally, ICE produced the agendas for a ten-day training conducted on August 13–24, 2018, regarding coordination between JTTFs and CTS. It also produced the agendas for a three-day counterterrorism operations training held on January 15–17, 2019.

The Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Investigations Handbook, dated November 12, 2014, sets out the policies, procedures, responsibilities, guidelines, and controls governing investigations related to counterterrorism or criminal exploitation. The mission of HSI’s Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) is to “proactively scrutinize known or suspected terrorists, identify and disrupt terrorist criminal enterprises, [and] prevent terrorists or other criminals from exploiting the nation’s immigration system […].”

• The Handbook broadly endorses HSI’s use of data brokers (including Accurint, Auto Track XP, and Thomson Reuters’ CLEAR database) without any limitations on the use of their data. ICE’s use of these services has been widely reported.
• The Handbook has language suggesting that HSI is working with schools to monitor students for “patterns of criminal behavior or radicalism.” This directive has echoes of the flawed belief that there is an identifiable path to radicalization, a discredited theory that has predominantly resulted in unwarranted scrutiny of Muslim communities.

The Brennan Center also obtained a presentation that provides an overview of the CTCEU and its Terrorist Tracking and Pursuit Group (TTPG), including its initiatives and the results of its investigations. ICE also produced a document that, while partially redacted, points to various public and private entities that can serve as resources for information regarding counterterrorism.

The Human Smuggling and Trafficking Investigations Handbook, dated August 21, 2015, sets out the policies, procedures, responsibilities, guidelines, and controls governing investigations related to human smuggling and trafficking. HSI’s Human Smuggling Unit identifies criminal smuggling and trafficking organizations, triages investigations according to public safety and national security risk, and coordinates with field offices to interdict the targeted organizations. (As described below, HSI split off human trafficking investigations into its own handbook in 2022; that handbook supersedes several sections within this one.)

The Human Trafficking Investigations Handbook, dated May 18, 2022, supersedes several sections of the 2015 handbook described above. This handbook governs HSI special agents’ investigations related to human trafficking. The National Human Trafficking Investigations Program is overseen by the Operations Unit within the Center for Countering Human Trafficking (CCHT), whose mission is “to combat human trafficking and the importation of goods produced with forced labor.” This Handbook was published after, and potentially in response to, a 2021 report from the DHS OIG finding that HSI had inconsistent policies, practices, and data collection efforts for human trafficking, which may have led HSI to “miss[] opportunities to assist human trafficking victims and support U.S. Attorneys in their prosecution efforts.”

Additionally, ICE produced a document that outlines indicators of human trafficking as part of the department’s Blue Campaign. It also produced a mostly redacted reference guide regarding victim identification reports of investigation (ROI), which provide HSI leadership with statistical information regarding victims of child exploitation and human trafficking.

Finally, the Brennan Center obtained the January 2020 concept of operations for HSI’s S.T.O.P. (Strategic Targeted Outreach Program) Trafficking effort to engage industries and raise public awareness to recognize and report human trafficking, along with a blank quarterly report template that captures information about the number of presentations conducted through the initiative

ICE did not produce the HSI Investigative Methods Handbook. Instead, ICE produced a series of training manuals and accompanying presentations for HSI special agents:*

• A presentation and May 2019 student guide regarding the border search exception to the Fourth Amendment, which has been interpreted to endow HSI special agents with broad search and seizure powers to stop and inspect a person or object within 100 miles of the U.S. border — an area that is home to two-thirds of the U.S. population and 9 of its 10 largest cities.
• A presentation and January 2019 student guide, largely redacted, regarding undercover operations.
• A presentation and February 2017 student guide regarding the use of confidential informants.
• A presentation and February 2017 student guide regarding electronic surveillance, which includes techniques like wiretapping. Another presentation includes information on Title III of the Wiretap Act, which governs the lawful interception of communications; the title of the presentation alludes to other “translation/transcription programs” that do not rely on Title III, but these sections are redacted.
• A presentation and trainee guide, both dated June 2020, regarding the “nature of certain national security threats facing” the U.S. and HSI’s “unique authorities” to confront them. Notably, almost half of the student guide is dedicated to information about Islam. The student guide also includes a heavily redacted section teaching special agents how to recognize “risk factors and indicators of radicalization and mobilization” to homegrown violent extremism, based on the debunked notion that people who commit mass violence can reliably be identified in advance. The presentation includes three tiers of indicators of radicalization, corresponding to indicators that are “highly diagnostic on their own,” “moderately diagnostic,” and “minimally diagnostic,” which ICE left unredacted.
• A presentation and March 2016 student guide instructing special agents how to plan and strategize their investigations. These documents also include information about various sources of information available to special agents, including DHS’s automated systems and open source databases.
• A presentation and January 2018 student guide regarding human smuggling and human trafficking investigations.
• A presentation and July 2018 student guide instructing officers on how to conduct interviews as part of their investigations.
• A presentation and July 2018 student guide regarding evidence processing, including what evidence is admissible and the methods and procedures to collect evidence.
• A presentation and August 2018 student guide regarding the Fourth Amendment. These materials also include guidance for investigative activities that impinge on First Amendment-protected activities and for the use of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, and other protected characteristics in law enforcement and intelligence activities.
• A presentation and September 2018 student guide regarding the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
• A presentation and December 2018 instructor guide regarding the Fifth Amendment right to due process.
• A presentation and December 2018 student guide regarding special agents’ obligations after they arrest someone.
• A presentation and March 2018 student guide instructing officers on how to find assets obtained illegally so that they may be searched and seized.
• A presentation detailing HSI agents’ arrest authority.
• An undated document outlines basic jurisprudence on when people have a reasonable expectation of privacy and when they do not.

*Almost none of the presentations specify the date they were created or updated. We noted one instance where a presentation was dated.  

The Brennan Center obtained a December 8, 2017, memo addressed to then-HSI Deputy Executive Associate Director Derek N. Benner, recommending that HSI domestic field offices report JTTF investigative activity directly to the National Security Investigations Division (NSID) after a declaration of a national security event or a U.S.-based terrorist attack that is deemed international terrorism. NSID would then report all activity through the chain of command to HSI leadership. The memo also mentions that many after-action reviews had found that HSI special agents faced difficulties reporting classified information and were unable to filter “need to know” information that would be necessary for national security event and international terrorism response operations.

The Brennan Center also obtained an April 3, 2018, memo from Benner to Thomas D. Homan, who was then the HSI Deputy Director and Senior Official Performing the Duties of Director (in effect, the acting director), that sets out a proposal to establish a unified reporting protocol following the declaration of a national security event or international terrorist attack. This recommendation came after several after-action reports found that HSI JTTF special agents had to respond to redundant requests for information in the aftermath of a national security event or international terrorist attack, leading to inaccurate and unvetted reporting to ICE leadership. Under this proposal, all entities in ICE would report directly to the NSID Counterterrorism Section (CTS), which would vet and consolidate information before reporting up the chain of command to HSI leadership.

A June 27, 2019, memo to Benner titled “Minimum Commitment and Requirements for Special Agent Assignments to the Joint Terrorism Task Forces” establishes that all HSI special agents are required to commit to a minimum of three years when assigned to a JTTF.

A February 21, 2017, memo addressed to all HSI employees from HSI’s Executive Associate Director, Peter Edge, titled “Implementing the President’s Border Security and Interior Immigration Enforcement Policies,” which instructs special agents to implement Executive Order (EO) 13767, “Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements,” and EO 13768, “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States,” empowering them to “take enforcement action against all removable aliens encountered in the course of their duties.” The memo also instructs special agents to detain undocumented persons pending a final determination of deportation from the U.S., following the EOs’ termination of “catch and release” policies. ICE rescinded this memo in February 2021 after President Biden issued EO 13993, “Revision of Civil Immigration Enforcement Policies and Priorities.”

Lastly, ICE produced a March 20, 2017, memo to Edge recommending that HSI terminate its participation in the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) notification process. TIDE is the U.S. government’s database of information on international terrorists. Though details are sparse due to ICE’s redactions, the memo explains that HSI’s process to update TIDE is inefficient and has low levels of compliance in the field and recommends restructuring the process.

May 2021 Original Production

August 2021 Supplemental Production

October 2021 Supplemental Production

December 2021 Supplemental Production

February 2022 Supplemental Production

March 2022 Supplemental Production

April 2022 Supplemental Production

May 2022 Supplemental Production

June 2022 Supplemental Production

July 2022 Supplemental Production

August 2022 Supplemental Production

October 2022 Supplemental Production

December 2022 Supplemental Production

March 2023 Supplemental Production