From the day that the Citizens Not Politicians “Yes on 1” campaign qualified for the November ballot in Ohio, politicians have worked strenuously to confuse and distract voters from using their power to fix a fundamentally broken system. Reforming the redistricting process would allow citizens to draw fair maps and undo politicians’ continually gerrymandered districts. The same people working to defeat Issue 1 have drafted inaccurate ballot summary language and conducted mass voter purges ahead of the general election.
In the meantime, some skeptics of the amendment have expressed concern that the new redistricting criteria could possibly diminish Black voters’ power to elect their preferred candidates. Civil rights groups, local faith leaders, and many Black elected officials reject this claim, often noting that the amendment would require maps that comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, constitutional rules against racial gerrymandering, and more rigorous state rules protecting communities of interest.
The amendment would also ensure that a party’s share of districts closely corresponds to the preferences of Ohio voters, bolstering an existing anti-gerrymandering provision in the state constitution that politicians have largely ignored. Though this standard would not supplant the priority of the Voting Rights Act’s requirements, opponents have wrongly claimed that the commission might disadvantage communities of color, particularly Black voters.
To test this claim, the Brennan Center analyzed more than 5,000 possible congressional maps from Harvard University’s Algorithm-Assisted Redistricting Methodology (ALARM) Project to determine the extent to which districts that fit the Citizens Not Politicians criteria might deviate from current districts’ demographic breakdown and potential to elect Black voter–preferred candidates.
Electing Black-Preferred Candidates in Columbus, Cleveland, and Akron
Black voters in Ohio have a strong history of electing their preferred candidates to office. In fact, the state is home to the oldest Black legislative caucus in the nation, and voters in the Cleveland area elected the state’s first Black member of Congress in 1968. Today, the Buckeye State’s delegation in the Congressional Black Caucus consists of three members: Reps. Joyce Beatty (OH-03), Shontel Brown (OH-11), and Emilia Sykes (OH-13). These districts have sizeable Black constituencies, representing 27.5, 44, and 13 percent of the total population in each district, respectively.
The state’s Eleventh District in Cleveland is a special case, as it historically was the only majority-minority congressional district in Ohio. Though the Black population in the district (and Cleveland) has decreased relative to other groups during the past few decades, the Eleventh District is an opportunity district for Black voters. Meaning, Black voters constitute a large enough share (41.8 percent) of the district voting-age population that they can elect their preferred candidates if supported by the votes of some non-Black Ohioans. Many redistricting reform advocates have underscored the need to preserve the traditional community of Black Clevelanders reflected in OH-11, a goal that is quite attainable under a reformed system that shifts power away from politicians.
Simulating Congressional District Maps Using CNP Criteria
To illustrate the opportunity that Issue 1 presents for Black voters in Ohio, we examined how the state’s three districts with Black representation might change over a range of possible maps. The ALARM Project’s simulated congressional redistricting plans allow us to use precinct-level voting data to draw over 5,000 possible maps. All simulations comply with current Ohio redistricting criteria in that they must be contiguous, have equal populations, be geographically compact, not split Cincinnati or Cleveland, minimize splitting of Columbus, split no more than 18 counties once and no more than 5 counties twice, and preserve county and municipal boundaries where possible.
Within the 5,000 simulations, we separately account for the proposed reform amendment’s partisan fairness criteria, which dictate that constitutional maps cannot deviate from the partisan preferences of voters by more or less than 3 percent. In Ohio, roughly 46 percent of voters prefer Democratic candidates in statewide elections and 54 percent prefer Republican candidates, meaning that a constitutionally compliant map would produce seven Democratic-leaning districts and eight Republican-leaning districts.
For each simulated redistricting plan, we evaluate the voting-age population for each racial group as a percentage of the district’s overall voting-age population. The ALARM Project reports demographic data for monoracial groups in congressional district simulations. That is, Ohio voters who self-identify as more than one race are counted in the “Two or more” category, separately from voters of a single race. Voters who self-identify as Hispanic/Latino are a singular demographic group, irrespective of race. In this analysis, “Black voting-age population” refers to Black voters over the age of 18.
While there is no single Black population threshold for electing Black-preferred candidates, we consider that changes in the existing Black voting-age population of less than 5 percent would not affect performance outcomes. This is especially true in the absence of sustained racial polarization among voters, as evidence by the success of candidates in all three districts. Best-case scenarios maintain or increase the Black voting-age population in relation to the current percent share.
Using Citizens Not Politicians Mapping Criteria in Districts 3, 11, and 13
Among the 5,000 simulated congressional maps, 452 unique redistricting plans produce seven Democratic and eight Republican districts. So about 10 percent of the simulations would yield a permissible partisan balance under the proposed constitutional amendment. Nearly two-thirds of these 452 plans would also pass the Freedom to Vote Act’s test prohibiting extreme partisan gerrymandering, which could soon become federal law and thus a criterion for maps in Ohio.
For each of the districts represented by Black members of Congress, most of the simulations do not significantly reduce the Black voting-age population relative to its current baseline. In Districts 11 and 13 in particular, there is very little variation across the simulated maps in the share of Black voters compared to their current levels.
The key finding in the simulations is what we do not see among these reviewed maps. None of the simulated plans results in a significant population shift for Cleveland’s Black community. The most by which any simulated plan decreases the share of Black voters is 2 percentage points below the current level. A total of 282 of the compliant simulations (62.6 percent) produce a Cleveland-based district where the share of Black voters drops by less than 1 percentage point, and nearly 100 of the simulations actually improve the Black voting-age population in the formerly majority-Black district. In other words, the range of likely changes for Black political opportunity would either be negligible or better than under the current maps.
Additionally, 348 of 452 simulated plans for the Thirteenth Congressional District (encompassing parts of Akron and northeast Ohio) would not decrease the Black voting-age population by more than 2 percent. And 136 of those plans would not reduce the share of Black voters by more than 1 percent.
Though there is a wider range of outcomes for Black voters in the Third Congressional District, about one-third of simulated Columbus congressional districts would increase the percentage of Black voters in the district.
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Overall, redistricting outcomes for Black voters would not be hampered by the proposed Citizens Not Politicians Amendment’s partisan fairness criteria. In fact, there would be several opportunities for improved outcomes under this new process.
Even though changing demographics have contributed to the state’s historically majority-Black district becoming an opportunity district, Black voters have been playing defense against self-interested politicians and redistricting bodies for far too long. The opportunity for change that Issue 1 presents would lead to improved political involvement and likely better outcomes for all Ohio voters. Our analysis demonstrates that the same advantages are available to Black voters. Reform offers a chance for Black voters and communities of color to proactively engage with the redistricting process and ensure their votes matter when and where they count.
