Certification, the statutory process by which officials sign off on the completion of election results, has historically been an uncontroversial postelection formality across the country. State law has long established that officials have a mandatory, nondiscretionary duty to certify elections.
Despite this well-settled law, states across the country are facing a new phenomenon. Since the 2020 election, more than 30 local officials nationwide have refused or threatened to refuse to certify election results. These officials often justify their misconduct with claims rooted in election denialism — the false idea that the 2020 election was stolen and that widespread fraud pervades our election system. Their efforts have not succeeded, often because state courts and state officials have intervened to protect the certification process. But the threat remains that rogue officials in several states may attempt to interfere with the timely certification of this year’s presidential election results.
In a presidential election year, efforts to disrupt certification pose a particularly acute threat. Under the Electoral Count Reform Act (ECRA), passed by Congress in 2022, state executives must certify their state’s slate of presidential electors by December 11, 2024. 3 U.S.C. §§ 5(a)(1), 7. Delaying certification by even a few days could place a state’s ability to certify by the ECRA deadline at risk.
Fortunately, state officials have several legal tools available to respond to any certification issues that arise — and to help prevent them in the first place. This guide provides an overview of those guardrails. It accompanies seven other guides in this series that address the specific certification safeguards in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.